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PROSECUTING THE INFORMANT CULTURE
Andrew E. Taslitz*
SNITCHING: CRIMINAL INFORMANTS AND THE EROSION OF AMERICAN
JUSTICE. By Alexandra Natapoff. New York and London: New York Univer-
sity Press. 2009. Pp. xi, 260. $29.95.
INTRODUCTION
Alexandra Natapoff,' in her outstanding new book, Snitching: Criminal
Informants and the Erosion of American Justice, makes a compelling case
for reform of the system by which we regulate police use of criminal
informants. Indeed, as other writers have discussed,' law enforcement's
overreliance on such informants has led to a "snitching culture" in which
informant snitching replaces other forms of law enforcement investigation
(pp. 12, 31, 88-89). Yet snitches, especially jailhouse snitches, are notoriously
unreliable.'
Informants snitch in exchange for benefits from the state. These benefits
include monetary payments, immunity from prosecution, sentence reductions,
and even the freedom to continue criminal activity-most commonly drug-
dealing-while police turn a blind eye (pp. 32, 47-54). The lure of such bene-
fits entices many informants into outright lying, and others into exaggeration,
contributing significantly to wrongful convictions. Indeed, so grave is the
innocence concern that numerous reformers have recommended a wide array
of changes to the law-from pretrial reliability hearings before permitting
informants to testify, to corroboration requirements before snitches may tes-
tify, to wider discovery, cautionary jury instructions, limitations on informant
rewards, and improved police officer training (pp. 190-99).
Courts or legislatures in some jurisdictions have occasionally adopted
some of these reforms piecemeal," while the FBI-though not most state law
enforcement agencies-has adopted relatively stringent rules on how police
"handlers" may treat their informant subjects (pp. 26, 47-49, 179-80,
* Professor, Howard University School of Law; former assistant district attorney, Philadel-
phia, PA.; B.A., Queens College, 1978; J.D., University of Pennsylvania Law School, 1981.
1. Professor of Law, Loyola Law School.
2. See, e.g., Andrew E. Taslitz, Wrongly Accused Redux: How Race Contributes to Convict-
ing the Innocent: The Informants Example, 37 Sw. L. REV. 1091, 1139-41 (2008) [hereinafter
Wrongly Accused Redux].
3. See PAUL GIANNELLI & MYRNA RAEDER, AM. BAR Ass'N, ACHIEVING JUSTICE: FREEING
THE INNOCENT, CONVICTING THE GUILTY 63-78 (2006).
4. Pp. 69-72; see PAUL GIANNELLI & MYRNA RAEDER, supra note 3, at 63-67.
5. Pp. 69-72; see PAUL GIANNELLI & MYRNA RAEDER, supra note 3, at 70-78.
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187-90). But compared to many other areas of the criminal justice system,
snitching goes largely unregulated (pp. 26, 83-84, 99).
Natapoff reviews all of these concerns concisely and effectively, adding
her voice to the call for change. She does not, however, recommend aban-
doning snitching because she recognizes that certain categories of grave
offenders-particularly white-collar offenders and gang-connected crimi-
nals-would escape unpunished without this investigative tool (pp. 11-12,
140-41). What she adds to the debate is a recognition that the overuse of
snitching in certain geographic areas and for certain types of crimes can
have ill social consequences well beyond convicting the innocent. These
consequences include increasing crime, decreasing police legitimacy and
community cooperation with the law, amplifying racial bias, harming police
transparency and accountability, and raising the risk of civil rights viola-
6tions. Rephrased, even if what law enforcement does in any isolated case
seems justified, the cumulative social cost of many such cases can far out-
weigh the cumulative social benefits. Natapoff argues for righting that
balance and thus makes a persuasive and comprehensive case for not miss-
ing the forest for the trees.
After reviewing, in Part I, the legal and cultural basics of the informant
system, this Review turns in Part II to examining Natapoff's argument that
the social (rather than individual case) cost-benefit analysis requires
changes in our current system of informant use. Natapoff's focus is primar-
ily on police, and secondarily on prosecutors. Her larger purpose, however,
is to make the case for change, rather than discussing how to bring those
changes about. In Part M, I focus on what I see as one prerequisite for moti-
vating systemic change: recognition of an aspirational ethical obligation of
prosecutors to consider the systemic social costs of informant-use policies,
rather than only the costs involved in each individual case. I do not, there-
fore, delve much in this brief Review into the practical politics of reform.
1. SNITCHING BASICS: THE RISKS TO TRUTH AND
THE CONSTITUTION IN INDIVIDUAL CASES
A. Incentives
1. For Informants
The dominance of snitching has been actively encouraged by the law.
The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines purportedly set presumptive sentences
while creating a system of departure from those sentences. The guidelines
create several powerful incentives for informants to snitch (pp. 29, 50-54).
First, upon the government's motion, the guidelines grant judges the author-
ity to sentence below the mandatory minimum sentence required for certain
6. Pp. 4-8; see infra Section RiA.
7. See HARRY I. SUBIN ET AL., THE PRACTICE OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW: PROSECUTION
AND DEFENSE 122-41 (2006) (explaining the operation of the U.S. Guidelines).
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offenses if an offender has offered "substantial assistance" in investigating
or prosecuting another wrongdoer.' Mandatory minimum sentences can be
harsh (for example, manufacturing less than two sugar packets worth of
crack cocaine carries a five-year sentence (p. 51)). Second, section 5K1.1 of
the guidelines permits the court to depart downward from the guidelines
sentence for any offense, whether a mandatory minimum applies or not,
originally only upon the government's motion stating that the defendant has
provided substantial assistance in investigating or prosecuting another per-
son.9 Although this latter provision's applicability is no longer contingent
upon the government's motion (p. 52)-a consequence of a series of deci-
sions in which the Supreme Court rendered the guidelines advisory rather
than mandatory o-sentencing courts still must compute guidelines recom-
mendations and give them substantial weight."
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 goes further still, permitting,
upon the government's motion, the reduction of a defendant's previously
imposed sentence if, after sentencing, he provides substantial assistance in
investigating or prosecuting another person.12 This provision incentivizes
jailhouse snitches to lie even after their conviction (p. 54). Many states have
analogous guidelines provisions, permitting sentencing mitigation for snitch
assistance, 3 and states that do not have guidelines reach a similar result on
the theory that this kind of assistance demonstrates remorse and reduces
culpability (pp. 49-50).
Snitches benefit financially, too: federal forfeiture rules allow courts to
award up to one quarter of the take in a drug bust or other property seizure
to informants up to $500,000.14 Local police departments pay snitches in
small-time cases too, using vouchers or cash. Some even pay in drugs di-
rectly, or indirectly by allowing "skimming" from the drugs used to make
the buy (p. 54).
Perhaps the greatest incentive for informants to snitch comes from their
desire for the freedom, whether granted officially or unofficially, to con-
tinue engaging in crime (pp. 32-33, 43-44, 109-11). Police can refrain
from arresting in the first place, or can arrest but consciously omit damning
8. Pp. 51-52; 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2006); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 5Kl.1 (2009).
9. P. 52; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5KI.1 (2009).
10. See, e.g., Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007); Kimbrough v. United States, 552
U.S. 85 (2007); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
11. Pp. 52-53; SUBIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 141-42, 145-46. Modest modifications in the
guidelines became effective November 1, 2010, formally recognizing the sentencing judge's in-
creased discretion. GUIDELINES: NEWS FROM THE U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, available at
http://www.ussc.gov/NEWSLETT/2010_- 05_GuideLines.pdf (last visited May 28, 2010).
12. Pp. 53-54; FED. R. CluM. P. 35.
13. See, e.g., Parrish v. State of Nevada, 12 P.3d 953, 956 & n.5 (Nev. 2000) (citing coopera-
tion-credit legislation in Nevada, Florida, and Georgia); VIRGINIA CRIMINAL SENTENCING
CoMMISSIoN, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT 138, available at www.vcsc.state.va.us/2007VCSCReport.pdf
(noting defendant-informant cooperation is the most frequent reason for sentencing reductions).
14. P. 54; 28 U.S.C. § 524(c) (2006).
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facts from the police report (pp. 47, 85-86). Some departments flatly ban
permitting new crimes, while others bar "condoning" them, but most de-
partment rules contain no such prohibitions or effectively permit this kind of
conduct for some types of crime, but not others (pp. 47-48). The U.S. De-
partment of Justice Guidelines governing FBI and some other federal
investigative agencies' use of informants fall into this last category, flatly
prohibiting, for example, informant violence (other than in self-defense) and
obstruction of justice, among others, while permitting illegal activity where
authorized in writing, in advance, for a limited time period and where the
authorizing agent has determined that the benefits outweigh the risks."
Although only prosecutors (not police) can confer immunity, courts of-
ten give great weight to promises of immunity by police, declaring the state
"estopped" from prosecuting informants who rely on these promises (pp.
48-49). Informants may also snitch in exchange for legitimate immunity
agreements or, more worrisomely, to protect third parties, such as family
members, from being charged with a crime (p. 49). These "wired" plea deals
attach or "wire" the outcome of the family member's case to the informant's
cooperation (p. 49). Prosecutors may also agree to postpone a case's dispo-
sition to allow an informant to "work off" his charges by continuing to
inform (p. 49).
2. For Law Enforcement
Law enforcement similarly has broad incentives to use informants. In
some instances, such as white-collar or gang crime, criminal activity is so
secretive, complex, or hard to detect, or involves such ever-present threats of
violence against co-conspirators straying from the criminal fold, that prose-
cution is impracticable without informants (pp. 29-30, 131-34, 140, 145).
In other cases, like drug crimes, informant use is simply easier than alterna-
tive investigative methods (p. 73).
The ease of using informants stems partly from the freedom it grants law
enforcement from many otherwise applicable legal and practical investiga-
tive limitations. Informants invited into criminals' homes and businesses
breach no "reasonable expectations of privacy," and thus do not constitute a
search for Fourth Amendment purposes. Likewise, informants are not sub-
ject to Title III and similar state electronic eavesdropping statutory
protections. 7 Nor does informant questioning of a suspect violate Miranda,
since an offender so questioned is not in a "police-dominated atmosphere,"
15. Pp. 47-48; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, GUIDELINES REGARDING THE
USE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION, available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/readingroomi/
ciguidelines.htm (last visited Aug. 24, 2010); UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S GUIDELINES REGARDING THE USE OF FBI CONFIDENTIAL HUMAN SOURCES, available
at www.justice.gov/ag/readingroom/guidelines.pdf (last visited Aug. 24, 2010).
16. Pp. 55-56; 1 PETER J. HENNING ET AL., MASTERING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 27-29, 34-
35 (2010) (summarizing the caselaw).
17. Pp. 56-57; 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) (2006).
18. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,445 (1966).
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and is therefore not in "custody."'9 Moreover, because informant-handler
interactions so often occur outside the formal processes of the law (particu-
larly where no arrest occurs or where key information is omitted from police
reports), deals may occur in total secrecy (pp. 83-86, 89-94). This secrecy
gives police the freedom to act without judicial scrutiny or prosecutorial
oversight (pp. 94-97). This lack of accountability and freedom from seeking
search warrants or wiretap orders, or completing cumbersome paperwork,
allows police to act quickly, cheaply, and without fear of challenge from
other institutions in the criminal justice system (pp. 31, 94-97). That lack of
oversight also saves police time and effort in how they monitor informants.
Many handlers give free reign to informants to do as they please in commit-
ting new crimes, with some actually aiding informants in gathering the
resources to engage in criminal conduct or allowing informants to take the
lead in running investigations (pp. 20, 27-28, 32-36). Some officers will
continue this deferential treatment so long as their informants continue to
deliver useful information (pp. 19-21, 32-34).
Police may also make only meager efforts to corroborate snitches' sto-
ries, abandoning the skepticism that reason requires (pp. 73-76). Not only
does this enable informants to lie; it also allows them to use snitching as a
tool to wreak revenge on enemies or eliminate competitors from criminal
markets (p. 36). Police may also be tempted to cut procedural corners or
play fast and loose with the truth, confident that lies or distortions will not
be uncovered (pp. 37-38, 75-76, 84-89).
Even if an informant is arrested and the case against him proceeds to
prosecution, that generally occurs pursuant to a plea deal. Prosecutors are
constitutionally obligated, under Brady v. Marylanfo and Giglio v. United
States,2 1 to produce materially exculpatory impeaching information to the
defense, including promises made to an informant in exchange for his testi-
mony and, typically, his prior criminal record, prior inconsistent statements,
and history of testimony and rewards in other cases (p. 92). However, in
United States v. Ruiz,2 the Court held that Giglio material need not be pro-
duced in advance of a guilty plea.
Many state and federal district courts simply track these constitutional
minima, though others do add further procedures (pp. 58-59). Often, how-
ever, the government exercises its "informers privilege" to hide an
informant's identity entirely in order to protect him or his usefulness as a
source (p. 59). This privilege is especially strong in a case's investigative
stage. At trial, however, the privilege is subject to a balancing test, where the
public's interest in the free flow of informant information is weighed against
the individual's right to prepare his defense (p. 59). Furthermore, the ac-
19. Pp. 46, 85-86; HENNING ET. AL., supra note 16, at 238-39, 251, 276 (summarizing the
caselaw).
20. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
21. 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972).
22. 536 U.S. 622, 625, 633 (2002).
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cused's Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him may
also require revealing an informant's identity at trial. 23
Moreover, in the few cases that actually go to trial, the Jencks Act re-
quires disclosure of one category of impeaching material-prior
inconsistent statements-but only after the witness testifies at trial, thus
limiting the defense's time for investigation to challenge such statements.2 4
So concerned was a panel of the Tenth Circuit with this system of insti-
tutionally sanctioned secrecy that it declared prosecutorial use of charge or
sentencing reductions to obtain informant cooperation a crime under the
federal antigratuity act. However, that decision was reversed by the Tenth
Circuit sitting en banc, which declared that Congress could not have in-
26tended this antibribery statute to apply to prosecutors. Other purported
legal protections against informant abuses, like the subjective entrapment
and outrageous government conduct defenses, are so hard to prove that they
are paper tigers (pp. 61, 171). Civil suits against the government where han-
dlers purportedly knowingly acquiesced to harm caused by informants are
similarly of limited value, partly because of police officer qualified immu-
nity and prosecutorial absolute immunity for conduct "intimately associated
with the judicial phase of the criminal process"-including knowingly using
false evidence or lying informants, even when that results in wrongful con-
viction (pp. 62-63).
Natapoff, having reviewed these rules in several tight introductory chap-
ters, summarizes the nature of the informant culture:
The overall picture of American informant law presented in this chapter is
one of tremendous official authority and discretion to use and reward crim-
inal informants with few legal limits. The constraints that do exist tend to
focus on the government's informational obligations rather than substan-
tive limits on the way the government can use criminal informants, and
even those informational obligations are tied to litigation and trials that oc-
cur infrequently. The end result of this laissez-faire, unregulated approach
is that the American practice of using criminal informants is centrally
shaped by individual decisions of police and prosecutors, with few external
controls and little judicial oversight or legislative or public scrutiny. (p. 67)
B. Wrongful Convictions
Barry Scheck and his colleagues Jim Dwyer and Peter Neufeld pub-
lished Actual Innocence27 at the turn of this century, the book that sparked
modem scholarly interest in wrongful convictions. Scheck and his co-
23. P. 59; see also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004); United States v. Lon-
bardozzi, 491 E3d 61, 72-75 (2d Cir. 2007).
24. Pp. 59-60; 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) (2006).
25. Pp. 60-61; United States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343, 1351 (10th Cir. 1998), rev'd en
banc 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1999).
26. United States v. Singleton, 165 F3d 1297, 1300 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
27. See BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS To EXECUTION, AND OTH-
ER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED (2000).
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authors then estimated that informant testimony influenced verdicts in 21%
of capital wrongful convictions.2 A later report reached a similar estimate of
false snitches' testimony contributing to all mistaken convictions in Califor-
29nia. In 2004, Northwestern University Law School's Center on Wrongful
Convictions reached a still-harsher conclusion, linking 45.9% of wrongful
capital convictions to lying informants, making them "the leading cause of
wrongful convictions in U.S. capital cases."o Professor Samuel Gross re-
cently concluded that nearly 50% of wrongful murder convictions stemmed
in significant part from false jailhouse or other snitches' testimony." Jail-
house snitches are particularly worrisome because they lie about persons
already associated with the criminal justice system, predisposing authorities
to uncritically believe tales of such persons' criminal wrongdoing.
1. Loving the Rats
Long-term handler-snitch relationships can lead to the phenomenon of
"falling in love with your rat" (p. 73). Police officer or prosecutor
dependence on the informant and the long hours spent working together
lead the participants to bond emotionally (pp. 73-74). As one prosecutor put
it, "[Y]ou spend time with this guy, you get to know him and his family. You
like him."32 But, because of these "warm and fuzzy" feelings, "you come to
believe that you do not have to spend much time or energy investigating the
case and you don't."33 That creates "a real danger that you lose your
objectivity."34 Explains another prosecutor (pp. 73-74), preconceptions
favoring the rat's story "affect future questioning of witnesses and
defendants; ... alter how investigators view the significance of witnesses
and particular pieces of evidence; and ... taint the way the case is perceived
by the prosecutors and agents."3 Tunnel vision thus leads law enforcement
to look for evidence confirming the rat, never seeking-or ignoring-
contradictory evidence, and giving undue weight to corroborating evidence
(pp. 74-76).
The lack of law enforcement skepticism and inadequate investigation
has led to striking miscarriages of justice. For example, prosecutors relied
28. Id. at 156.
29. See Nina Martin, Innocence Lost, S.F. MAG., Nov. 2004, at 78, 88.
30. ROB WARDEN, CENTER ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, THE SNITCH SYSTEM (2004),
available at www.law.northwestem.edulwrongfulconvictions/issues/causesandremedies/snitches/
snitchsystembooklet.pdf.
31. Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States, 1989 through 2003, 95 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523,543-44 (2005).
32. P. 73 (quoting Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cooperation with Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of
Truth Telling and Embellishment, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 917, 944 (1999)).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Steven M. Cohen, What Is True? Perspectives of a Former Prosecutor, 23 CARDOZO L.
REV. 817, 825 (2002).
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on Marion Albert Pruett's "testimony against a prisoner accused of killing
Pruett's cellmate" (pp. 74-75). They even put Pruett in the federal witness
protection program, only to discover that he had killed the cellmate himself
and, while under federal protection, engaged in a continuing string of bank
robberies and murders (p.75).
Government ignorance about impeaching evidence can bite the state lat-
er, as it did when a Baltimore prosecutor in a 2003 murder trial was unaware
that his jailhouse snitch "was also on the Baltimore police payroll as an in-
formant." 6 In Los Angeles, the district attorney's office consciously decided
to avoid tracking its informants or evidence of their unreliability because the
office feared that doing so would create discovery favorable to the defense
and reveal the sheriff's department's violations of offenders' right to counsel
(p. 75). One consequence of this intentional ignorance was the wrongful
murder conviction of Tom Goldstein, who spent twenty years in prison be-
cause of lying jailhouse snitch Edward Fink's testimony (p. 75).
Unbeknownst to the prosecutor trying the case, Fink "had received lenience
for numerous offenses by working as an informant for the local police de-
partment for many years"-impeaching information never produced for the
defense at trial (p. 75). Some prosecutors have outright concealed known
informant lies. In one of the more infamous cases involving such conceal-
ment, the prosecution concealed the fact that an informant set up Delma
Banks for a murder conviction for twenty years, a fact that the prosecution
continually denied, though it knew the allegation to be true (pp. 75-76).
2. Race
Race and purposeful ambiguity can create a snowball effect of errors
early in an investigation, leading to further errors later on. An empirical
study of search warrant practices in San Diego concluded that warrants for
evidence of drug crimes were disproportionately granted for black suspects
relative to white suspects." This disparity occurred even though probable
cause affidavits for black and white suspects alike equally relied on vague,
boilerplate language or other flawed information, arguably rendering the
affidavits insufficient to establish probable cause. 9 One reason for this in-
sufficiency is that the vague and conclusory references to informants'
character and bases of information did not justify treating those informants'
tips as reliable.
36. P. 75; Alisa Bralove, Murder-prosecutor's ignorance was no excuse for Brady flaw,
DAILY RECORD (Baltimore), Sept. 5, 2003.
37. See Taslitz, Wrongly Accused Redux, supra note 2, at 1099-108.
38. Laurence A. Benner & Charles T. Samarkos, Searching for Narcotics in San Diego:
Preliminary Findings from the San Diego Search Warrant Project, 36 CAL. W. L. REV. 221, 230
(2000).
39. See id. at 239.
40. See id.
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Yet when warrants were issued for whites, those warrants turned out to
be highly accurate (meaning they resulted in obtaining evidence of crime).
On the other hand, warrants issued for black suspects were highly inaccu-
rate,4 1 suggesting that law enforcement officers and judges were more
willing to believe questionable informants in cases involving black suspects
than for those involving white suspects. Other research reveals that police
willingness to believe ill of blacks, and blacks' fear of just such law en-
42
forcement beliefs, leads to a self-reinforcing, escalating system of error.
Thus, if police do not uncover evidence of black criminality via search war-
rants, they may zealously pursue other investigative techniques.43 If searches
do produce such evidence, additional overly zealous investigative tactics
may similarly be the police weapons of choice."
Such aggressive and time-consuming techniques lead distrustful blacks
to react angrily.45 Police interpret such anger as concealment, leading to still
more aggressive methods and resulting in flawed confessions, mistaken eye-
witness identifications, and, finally, more false convictions.46
3. Weak Fail-safes
While juries may sometimes accurately detect informant lies, they often
fail to do so (pp. 77-78). Recent studies suggest that jurors do not ade-
quately discount the veracity of informants shown to be compensated for
their testimony.47 Jurors also cannot use impeaching information never made
available to them-a frequent occurrence, as explained above.48 Nor do ju-
rors even get a chance to render a credibility judgment in the vast majority
of cases, which are disposed of by a guilty plea (p. 77).
It may seem odd to imagine large numbers of innocent persons pleading
guilty. Yet it is far from uncommon. The snitch system can result in a case
that seems heavily stacked against even an innocent defendant. Sentencing
guidelines exact a heavy price for those convicted after trial.49 Innocent de-
fendants with prior criminal records or associations may have every reason
41. See Taslitz, Wrongly Accused Redux, supra note 2, at 1124-31.
42. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Wrongly Accused: Is Race a Factor in Convicting the Innocent?, 4
OHIO ST. J. CuM. L. 121 (2006) [hereinafter Wrongly Accused].
43. See Taslitz, Wrongly Accused Redux, supra note 2, at 1124-31 (analyzing high search
warrant error rates for black suspects); ANDREW E. TASLITZ ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 50-51 (4th ed. 2010) (illustrating such techniques).
44. See TASLITZ ET AL., supra note 43, at 1091-92.
45. See id. at 1099-108 (analyzing eyewitness identification); Taslitz, Wrongly Accused,
supra note 42, at 130-33 (analyzing interrogation).
46. See Taslitz, Wrongly Accused, supra note 42, at 130-33.
47. P. 77; see Jeffrey S. Neuschatz et al., The Effects of Accomplice Witnesses and Jailhouse
Informants on Jury Decision Making, 32 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 137 (2008).
48. See supra text accompanying notes 20-24.
49. See supra text accompanying notes 8-13.
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to fear that their protestations of innocence will be ignored.s Overworked
public defenders and limited discovery may rob the innocent of the re-
sources to prove their case (pp. 69, 91-94, 206). Cross-examination,
discovery, and cautionary jury instructions-the traditional tools of adver-
sarial combat-are thus unlikely to do much good (p. 78). Add in a tempting
offer of reduced charges, sentences, or probation by the prosecutor, and a
guilty plea can be hard to resist." The very secrecy of the informant process
and much of the plea negotiation process, however, makes it hard to know
how many innocent persons fingered by informants have abandoned their
fate to the guilty plea (pp. 79-80). Nevertheless, there have been infamous
revelations of such abuses, most notably the exonerations of at least 135
defendants framed by police perjury, most of whom pled guilty to drug-or-
gun possession-related crimes in Los Angeles, Dallas, and Tulia, Texas.52
Most recommended reforms, which focus on improved procedural pro-
tections at trial-such as by corroboration requirements, reliability hearings,
and stronger discovery rules-would do little to solve the problem. As Na-
tapoff explains:
[Such trial procedures] do not directly affect plea bargains, namely, the
vast majority of criminal cases. They also do not affect the process of us-
ing informants in investigations or to obtain warrants, techniques that lead
to thousands of bad searches and arrests every year. Such procedures also
do not reduce informants' underlying incentives to lie in the first place. Fi-
nally, they leave untouched police and prosecutorial reliance on unreliable
informants in shaping investigations, arrests, and charging decisions.
(p. 8 1)
II. SOCIETAL IMPACT OF WIDESPREAD SNITCHING
Widespread snitching-even when reliable-has broader ill social ef-
fects, particularly because snitching is concentrated in neighborhoods
heavily populated by vulnerable populations. Natapoff carefully documents
the nature of this concentration and its ill effects.
A. Societal Costs of Snitching
1. Disproportionate Punishment
The consequences of snitch concentration can be grave. Notably, it
"skews the system's evaluation of guilt and innocence" (p. 34). Thus one
general principle of criminal liability is that "the worse the crime, the worse
50. See Taslitz, Wrongly Accused Redux, supra note 2, at 1106-07.
51. Cf Andrew E. Taslitz, Prosecutorial Preconditions to Plea Negotiations: "Voluntary"
Waivers of Constitutional Rights, 23 CiuM. JUST. 14 (2008) [hereinafter Prosecutorial Precondi-
tions] (explaining the psychological, economic, political, and cultural forces that make it hard for
even innocent defendants to reject guilty plea offers).
52. Pp. 79-80; Samuel R. Gross & Barbara O'Brien, Frequency and Predictors of False
Conviction: Why We Know So Little, and New Data on Capital Cases, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
927, 931 (2008).
1086 [Vol. 109:1077
Prosecuting the Informant Culture
the punishment" (pp. 33). Yet, Natapoff notes, "[t]his foundational rule is
routinely flouted in the world of snitching" (p. 33). For example, prosecu-
tors charged not only Crips gang member, drug dealer, and paraplegic
Cedric Robertson with drug offenses, but also his girlfriend, Lakisha Mur-
phy, and four active gang members. Lakisha, the sentencing judge agreed,
was "not part of the gang or Cedric's drug business but was only marginally
involved because she lived with and cared for her paraplegic partner" (p.
33). Lakisha, however, received a mandatory ten-year sentence, while the
four active gang members, whose crimes were far worse, received signifi-
cantly lower sentences because they cooperated against Cedric while
Lakisha did not. So troubling was this topsy-turvy version of justice that the
judge apologized to Lakisha, telling her that "it seems unfortunate in this
case that you're doing more time than some of these guys did . .. and there's
nothing I can do about it" (p. 33).
Outcomes like Lakisha's can be hard to avoid because the most valuable
snitches-those with the most information to sell-also tend to be the worst
actors." Those with the best product to sell (information) can demand the
highest price from buyers (prosecutors)." The result is to turn legislative
sentencing schemes on their heads, with the least culpable being treated
most harshly, and the most culpable just the opposite (p. 34).
Reliance on informants also tends to worsen racial and geographic dis-
parities. Informants fink on those they know, who tend to be their neighbors,
former schoolmates, family, or others within their socioeconomic group or
local community (pp. 35-36). This creates a cycle of ever-increasing law-
enforcement focus on the nation's poorest residents. Perceptions of racial
disparities can be amplified as well where, for example, less culpable,
non-cooperating African American offenders face harsher penalties than
cooperating white offenders, the most infamous such example involving
white mafia hit man John Martorano in a 1999 case in Boston (pp. 33-34).
2. Disparate Impact on Poor Minority Communities
The degree of snitch concentration is by far the greatest in poor, black,
urban communities (p. 205). Much has been written about both the
concentration of crime and aggressive police tactics in these communities."
The result? One in three young African American males, roughly between
ages twenty and twenty-nine, are supervised by the criminal justice system
at any given time. The figure rises to 50 percent in some major cities like
Baltimore and Washington, DC, and rises still higher in certain neighbor-
hoods (pp. 101-02). "The chance of a black man born in 1991 spending
53. Pp. 33-34 (quoting William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law's Disappear-
ing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REv. 2548, 2564-65 (2004)).
54. See Taslitz, Pmsecutorial Preconditions, supra note 51, at 17-18 (explaining plea-
bargaining markets).
55. See, e.g., p. 103; RYAN S. KING, DISPARITY BY GEOGRAPHY: THE WAR ON DRUGS IN
AMERICA'S CITIEs 2 (2008); MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE (1999); William J. Stuntz, Un-
equal Justice, 121 HARv. L. REV. 1969, 1970-71 (2008).
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time in prison at some point in his life," Natapoff explains, "hovers around
one-third-higher than his chances of attending college, getting married, or
joining the military" (pp. 101-02).
Although blacks and whites use drugs at similar rates, the rate of incar-
ceration of blacks is "vastly higher ... than white male offenders" (p. 102).
Blacks are also sentenced more harshly than whites for the same offense,
even controlling for criminal history (p. 102). Although the data for Latinos
is less voluminous than for blacks, the trend seems to be the same for
both groups (p. 102). These disparities stem largely from the war on
drugs-disparities that were foreseeable, and likely actually foreseen, by the
drug warriors at the time their legislative troops voted for the authorizing
legislation.
As is also well-documented, the drug war has been waged primarily
against blacks and Latinos, and more specifically against blacks and Latinos
in poor, racially segregated, inner-city communities.17 Many explanations for
this have been offered, including the fairly common-sense notion that the
poor live in small, crowded quarters and, having little money for more ex-
pensive entertainments, tend to spend much of their leisure time socializing
on the streets." That makes it easier for police to detect their drug use com-
pared to middle class users, who are more likely, for example, to snort
cocaine in the comfort of their bedrooms with window shades pulled
down. 9
Law enforcement is thus "the most palpable form of governance to make
itself felt in these neighborhoods," writes Natapoff, making "experiences
with police, prosecutors, probation officers, and courts . . ." routine (p. 103).
Because informants are so readily used as a means of investigation in drug
cases, and because many drug offenses carry mandatory minimums that can
be avoided only by snitching, "ratting" is likely to be pervasive in these
neighborhoods (pp. 39, 50-53, 102-08). Although precise data are unavail-
able, Natapoff analyzes the available data thoroughly. She estimates,
perhaps conservatively (p. 107), that about 6 percent of young black men in
many of these neighborhoods are snitches (p. 107). Explains Natapoff:
Six percent would be a lot. It would implicate many extended families,
apartment complexes, neighborhood events, and church congregations. It
would make it likely that someone-maybe more than one someone-in
that group or institution or network would have already given information,
or might actively be trying to find incriminating information about others,
and would have the police's ear when he does. (p. 107)
56. MICHAEL ToNRY, MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 3-7
(1995).
57. P. 115; Taslitz, WnglyAccused Redux, supra note 2, at 1124-25.
58. See Andrew E. Taslitz, The Fourth Amendment in the Twenty-First Century: Technology,
Privacy, and Human Emotions, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 167-68 (2002).
59. TONRY, supra note 56, at 105-06.
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3. Increased Violence and Other Crime
Informers who have ongoing relationships with handlers who have fal-
len in love with their rat are readily believed by law enforcement (pp. 73-
74). Yet to those snitched on or neighborhood observers, such tales may be
questionable. Furthermore, informants engaged in ongoing investigations
are free to continue wreaking havoc on their communities. They may threat-
en crime victims and silence them, thereby aiding informants in hiding their
crimes (pp. 38-39). Relatedly, snitches continue to commit new crimes
(pp. 32-33, 39-42). Community members come to see snitching as but one
cost of doing illegal business (pp. 33-34). "Do the crime, fink on another,
don't do the time" is the law's new message (pp. 43-44). Those who refuse
to turn in others, who simply accept their just desserts, face harsh punish-
ment. Rats do not (pp. 124-25).
Widespread criminal violence against the police would be a difficult
way of offenders routinely escaping punishment. Civilian witness intimida-
tion would ordinarily be unlikely as well. But replacing police and ordinary
witnesses with snitches generally means turning one criminal against an-
other (pp. 39-42). Violence seems more acceptable in this situation because
there are no good guys. Heavy reliance on snitches thus exposes snitches to
high levels of threatened and actual violence (pp. 39-42). This in turn cre-
ates a culture more accepting of violence generally, raising the number of
threats against civilian witnesses and even silencing witnesses who are never
threatened directly, but fear the violent consequences of cooperating with
the police (pp. 42-43).
4. Preying on the Vulnerable, Destroying Intimate Relationships
Law enforcement, though dependent on its rats, is also often too tolerant
of violence against their informants, seeing it as a form of their "getting
what they deserve for having broken the law in the first place" (p. 39). Po-
lice may also often prey on the most vulnerable suspects, like "addicts,
juveniles, people with mental disabilities, or those for whom prison seems
life-threatening," as they are often "more likely to agree to cooperate even if
the benefits are uncertain or small, or the risks very high" (pp. 40-41).
Lacking counsel or resources, facing arrest, perhaps fearing drug with-
drawal, these vulnerable populations "become informants out of fear,
ignorance, and their perception that they have no choice" (p. 42). They may
for similar reasons, cautions Natapoff, "also be more likely to provide false
evidence under pressure to produce information" (p. 41).
Snitching additionally creates pressure to distort or destroy intimate re-
lationships, forcing mothers to testify against sons, wives against husbands,
friends against friends-sometimes truthfully, sometimes not (p. 117). This
can fray the bonds of social trust. Such bonds are already under significant
strain in poor neighborhoods because, lacking strong economic institutions,
"people rely on family and informal networks for jobs, income, shelter,
child care, and other vital resources" (p. 117). Moreover, as much research
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demonstrates, strong social ties facilitate order and safety; weak social ties
permit disorder and encourage crime.60 Yet weak ties simultaneously make it
easier for undercover narcotics officers "to penetrate networks of friends
and acquaintances and thus to turn former friends into foes, a cycle fur-
ther weakening community trust.
5. Procedural Injustice, Community Distrust
Geographically concentrated snitching thus destroys even-handed jus-
tice; raises crime generally, and violent crime specifically; frays community
bonds; heightens community fear; and does much of this through secret
processes that shield participants from accountability. The law rewards the
worst, punishing them the least, and undermines punishment's deterrent val-
ue as well (pp. 43-44). Justice is for sale; drug addiction thrives (pp. 44,
110-11). All this seems to occur with police tolerance, sanction, or even
encouragement. As procedural justice research has long demonstrated, how-
ever, persons who perceive processes as unfair-and arbitrary, secret
processes like those involving snitches are so perceived (p. 129)-refuse to
cooperate with law enforcement and will be more likely to break the law.62
As crime rises further, identifying and prosecuting true offenders becomes
harder (pp. 115-16).
In the view of some observers, community outrage has spawned the
"Stop Snitching" movement as a means of protest (p. 121). The movement
began with the "Stop Snitching" DVD, circulating in Baltimore since 2004
(p. 122). The DVD follows a local rapper and various interviewees, who
complain about corrupt police officers and threaten to harm snitches (p. 22).
The video spawned the rise of "STOP SNITCHING" t-shirts, then efforts to
ban the t-shirts, followed by the apparent endorsement of the t-shirt's mes-
sage by some rappers (pp. 122-24). Many members of law enforcement and
their sympathizers see the movement as but a modem manifestation of wit-
ness intimidation (pp. 123-35). Natapoff apparently agrees that the line
between the movement's originally intended message and law enforcement's
perceived message of witness intimidation is a fuzzy one (pp. 122-25, 131-
35).
Indeed, the Stop Snitching DVD's producer insists that the DVD was not
aimed at civilian witnesses, and most commentators agree that this was true
of the original Stop Snitching movement overall (p. 125). The moral mes-
sage to some was that if you do wrong, you should suffer the consequences
60. P. 117; see Robert J. Sampson et al., Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel
Study of Collective Efficacy, 277 Sci. 918 (1997) (social dislocation undermines community effi-
cacy, disabling its ability to regulate crime and violence); Robert J. Sampson & William Julius
Wilson, Toward a Theory of Race, Crime, and Urban Inequality, in CRIME AND INEQUALITY 37, 38
(John Hagan & Ruth D. Peterson etc., 1995).
61. TONRY, supra note 56, at 106.
62. See Tom R. TYLER & YUEN J. Huo, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOP-
ERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS (2002); Tom R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW
(1990).
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if caught and refrain from turning on your associates. In other words, it is
wrong to save yourself by hurting someone else (p. 125).
Though the Stop Snitching message had its roots in the underworld, Na-
tapoff argues that it readily spread to a noncriminal audience because it
became seen as an expression of distrust of the police and the criminal jus-
tice system. Writes Natapoff:
Inner-city America has been living with drug informants for the duration of
the war on drugs-over twenty years. That represents two decades of
twelve-year-olds like my Baltimore student watching the "police let deal-
ers stay on the corner 'cuz they snitchin.'" It represents ... two decades of
the kinds of unreliability and violence that we now know to be associated
with informant use. For residents of those communities, it has also been
two decades of watching addicts, girlfriends and boyfriends, family mem-
bers, and other vulnerable acquaintances succumb to police pressure to
provide information under threat of increasingly severe mandatory drug
sentences. "Stop snitching" is thus not merely a reflection of historic dis-
trust: the public policy of using informants itself contributes to the sense
that today's law enforcement is all too often unreliable or unfair. (p. 128)
Witness intimidation is a vile offense, agrees Natapoff, who bemoans
the connection some critics draw between encouraging that offense and the
Stop Snitching movement (pp. 133-35). Natapoff thinks it important to un-
derstand the movement as a social protest against the communal harm done
by the snitching system (pp. 126-28, 136). The costs to community safety
and order, egalitarian values, and communal bonds of trust have been high,
yet the payoff seems small given that decades of the snitch-abetted war on
drugs has yet to bring victory (pp. 119, 138).
B. Methods for Reducing the Societal Cost of Snitching
1. The White-Collar Model
Importantly, however, Natapoff concedes that in other contexts the cost-
benefit analysis may be quite different (p. 140). Indeed, informant use in
white-collar cases, argues Natapoff, offers a paradigm case of (mostly) us-
ing snitches appropriately (pp. 165-66). These cases often expose offenders
to both civil and criminal liability, and the civil system heavily regulates
businesses in ways that can promote transparency and accountability and
provide alternatives to harsh criminal sanctions (pp. 152-53). White-collar
offenders, moreover, have the resources to hire counsel. Negotiation thus
occurs not between a vulnerable individual and an aggressive officer but
between defense counsel and prosecutors (pp. 155-56). This results in a
more formal, open, and well-informed process (pp. 165-66).
Defense counsel engage in proffer sessions, discussing what information
their client has to offer, but only after reaching clear, written agreements
limiting the use of that proffer against the client (pp. 156-57). The terms of
any agreement to cooperate are similarly in writing, providing greater clarity
as to the obligations created as well as greater transparency for review
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should disputes over the agreement arise in the future (pp. 156-58). When
the investigation is completed, its details are likely to become public, en-
hancing transparency and accountability further (though the opposite can
happen as well).
Prosecutors are also less likely to act rashly because they recognize the
negative collateral consequences of their decisions for corporate sharehold-
ers, pension holders, and innocent employees (p. 165). Nor are white-collar
criminal prosecutions concentrated in particular geographic areas based on
race or class; this minimizes the social harms of snitching (pp. 139-40, 205-
06). Prosecutors still retain enormous power, and there may, in the eyes of
some commentators, still be much to criticize (p. 166). But relative to
snitching in inner-city neighborhoods, corporate snitching occurs with far
fewer power disparities, less injury to the innocent, little harm to geographic
communities or egalitarian values, little risk of increasing crime or decreas-
ing community trust in law enforcement, greater documentation, more
transparency and accountability, and better legal representation (p. 140).
2. Natapoff's Solutions
Part of Natapoff's solution for the harms of snitching in inner-city com-
munities is to make this kind of snitching more like that which occurs in the
corporate context (p. 141). Thus she would mandate legal counsel for un-
charged suspects considering cooperation; limit the use of vulnerable
informants like juveniles, the mentally disabled, or drug addicts; allow in-
formants who testify for the defense to apply to an independent authority to
receive benefits for their cooperation; widen discovery mandated before
entering guilty pleas; and expand and improve community policing and oth-
er efforts to enhance trust between police and the communities they serve
(pp. 182-200).
Apart from these efforts to level the playing field, Natapoff recommends
ways to reduce snitching's criminogenic effects by legislatively prohibiting
those who commit certain particularly heinous offenses from working off
their crimes by snitching, flatly banning informants from being authorized
to commit any crime of violence, and mandating the reporting of known
serious or violent crimes by informants (pp. 180-82). Natapoff would also
require law enforcement agencies to collect and publicize data on informant
use, including the race, ethnicity, gender, and location of informants and the
benefits they received in the hope that doing so will aid the decision maker's
cost-benefit analyses and create communal pressure for change where those
analyses are flawed (pp. 179-80). Natapoff also recommends that all juris-
dictions adopt detailed informant use guidelines, for both police and
prosecutors, that focus primarily (though not exclusively) on minimizing the
danger of informant lies or mistakes in individual cases (pp. 179-80, 187-
90).
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3. Unanswered Questions
Natapoff's beautifully argued book, as with all important works of ac-
cessible length, still leaves open a host of related questions. The ones that
most concern me involve prosecutorial competence and obligation. Natapoff
recognizes that "[pirosecutorial guidelines are primarily a matter of internal
self-regulation," leaving few, if any, remedies for their violation (p. 190).
Yet, she concedes, "such guidelines and internal rules are crucial to improv-
ing informant practices, since so much of informant use is delegated to the
discretion and judgment of such law enforcement actors" (p. 190). If this is
so, do prosecutors have an ethical obligation to adopt such guidelines, par-
ticularly ones that seek to address the systemic harms of the snitching
system, rather than focusing only on the prosecutor's more commonly rec-
ognized duty to "do justice" in an individual case?3 Are prosecutors
competent to make such systemic judgments or fix systemic flaws stemming
from snitching? Can criminal justice institutions better harness political
forces to aid prosecutors in these tasks? How likely are prosecutors to un-
dertake such action voluntarily anyway? This Review now turns to outlining
an answer to these interrelated questions.
III. SNITCHING AND THE PROSECUTORS' SYSTEMIC OBLIGATIONS
My argument is two-fold. First the prosecutor's traditional role of "do-
ing justice"-which focuses on the merits of the individual case-must be
modified to sensitize the prosecutor to subconscious forces that can contrib-
ute to prosecutorial error, a model I call "Do-Justice Adversarialism."6
Second, this model must be supplemented by a "Medical Model" that fo-
cuses on the broader social consequences of the prosecutor's decisions, thus
creating a prosecutorial obligation to consider the aggregated social effects
of the prosecutor's many individual choices. I see both models as best
served by internal self-regulation and perhaps "best practices" aspirational
standards, rather than a formal sanctioning system. Along the way, I will
illustrate the roots of these models in current practice-thereby demon-
strating their political feasibility-and will offer a comment on their
technological feasibility. I present the traditional model of prosecutorial
obligations and my suggested tweaks primarily to contrast it with, and bet-
ter explain, the Medical Model, which is my primary concern.
63. See infra notes 65-94 and accompanying text (discussing this question).
64. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Judging Jena's D.A.: The Pmsecutor and Racial Esteem, 44
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393, 396 (2009) [hereinafter Taslitz, Judging Jena] (elaborating on the
arguments made here about prosecutor ethical obligations, though not applying them to the infor-
mant context, as I do here).
1093April 2011 ]
Michigan Law Review
1. Modified "Do-Justice Adversarialism"
The adversary system relies on metaphors of market exchange and bat-
tle.6 The market metaphor most aptly applies to plea bargaining, in which
the prosecutor may sell, for example, reduced charges against the accused
in exchange for the accused's cooperation in investigating other crimes
and minimizing the costs of prosecution by avoiding a jury trial." But ad-
versaries may also each be seen as selling a product-a particular legal
story-that they want judges or juries to buy.61 In this sense too, the prosecu-
tor and defense compete with one another. The battle metaphor views the
competition as a binary contest-one side wins, one side loses-rather than
an exercise in persuasion subject to a range of potential outcomes.6 Battle
imagery also makes clear that the courtroom struggle is expected to be intel-
lectually and emotionally brutal. Yet the difference between these
metaphors is ultimately one of emphasis. For both metaphors, the struggle is
meant to produce truth, or at least justice. Much like Adam Smith's invisible
hand, the selfish struggle of each side to maximize its own interests will end
up best serving society.o A lawyer thus does good by serving her client
zealously, limited only by the rules of the game.
The prosecutor is said to be unique, however, in that her duty is to "pur-
sue justice."72 The meaning of this term is ambiguous and contested." Yet it
clearly refers to prosecutors sometimes tempering their zeal; a tweaking of,
rather than a replacement of, the adversarial model's obligations.74 The pri-
mary justification for this tempering is that the state's enormous resources
relative to the defense may violate a core assumption of the adversarial
model: that the struggle is between equally matched adversaries." "Doing
justice" might be given an expansive meaning, which some prosecutors in-
deed assign it.1 But the more common conception is a minimalist one,
focusing on the prosecutors avoiding conscious, intentional actions that sig-
65. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Interpretive Method and the Federal Rules of Evidence: A Call
for a Politically Realistic Hermeneutics, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 329, 347-48 (1995) [hereinafter
Taslitz, Politically Realistic].
66. See Taslitz, Prosecutorial Preconditions, supra note 51, at 17-18.
67. See ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RAPE AND THE CULTURE OF THE COURTROOM 103 (1999).
68. See id.
69. See id. at 103-04.
70. See id. at 103-05.
71. See id. at 103-04.
72. ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 13
(2007).
73. See Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice"?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
607, 613-18 (1999).
74. See id. at 634-35 (describing the traditional understanding of the prosecutor's duty to
"do justice").
75. See DANIEL MARKOVITz, A MODERN LEGAL ETHICS: ADVERSARY ADVOCACY IN A DE-
MOCRATIC AGE 86-88 (2008).
76. See infra notes 106-125 and accompanying text.
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nificantly subvert the adversary system." Although the model might also
prohibit some negligent actions, the negligence paradigm's scope is narrow,
and it still generally involves the prosecutor's failure to properly use infor-
mation that could have been available to his conscious mind. I call this
traditional model "Do-Justice Adversarialism."
Do-Justice Adversarialism is rooted in the "case processing" model.
This strategy evolved from the Wickersham Report on Prosecution, a 1931
effort to professionalize criminal justice, divorcing it from corrupt political
influence.so The report saw the prosecutor as serving four functions: investi-
gating crime, deciding who shall be prosecuted, preparing cases for trial,
and trying those cases and arguing their appeals. The prosecutor's role was
thus to promote efficient, effective case processing from accusation to
conclusion. The ideal was to obtain convictions and punishments rather than
plea bargains, dismissals, or other less-punitive dispositions.
During the 1950s and 1960s, surveys revealed a far more complex role
for many prosecutors in practice, resulting in an important American Bar
Foundation Report in 1969. Nevertheless, the more influential report in the
coming decades was that of the 1967 President's Commission on Law En-
forcement and the Administration of Justice, which embraced a variant of
the case processing model." The influence of that report and its progeny has
resulted in a case processing model only marginally different from that em-
braced by the Wickersham Commission.8 The new model recognizes a role
for plea bargaining, but still expects counsel to treat each case as unique,
insisting that like cases be treated alike, with efficient case disposition the
prosecutor's primary goal.8 ' Police largely determine prosecutor workload
86by funneling cases to the prosecutor for resolution. Consistent with re-
77. See Green, supra note 73, at 634 (cataloguing "do justice" obligations that involve pri-
marily conscious prosecutorial choices, though also including prosecutorial negligence avoidance).
78. See, e.g., R. MICHAEL CASSIDY, PROSECUTORIAL ETHIcs 95-101 (2005) (surveying ethi-
cal limits on prosecutors' trial and pretrial behavior); CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY, HARMFUL ERROR:
INVESTIGATING AMERICA'S LOCAL PROSECUTORS (2003) (cataloguing examples of prosecutorial
misconduct, all of which fit the description above).
79. Catherine M. Coles, Evolving Strategies in 20th-Century American Prosecution, in THE
CHANGING ROLE OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 177, 182 (John L. Worrall & M. Elaine Nugent-
Borakove eds., 2008).
80. See U.S. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAw OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT (1931).
81. See id. at 12.
82. Coles, supra note 79, at 183.
83. See id. at 182-83; FRANK W. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION To CHARGE A Sus-
PECT WITH CRIME (Frank J. Remmington ed. 1969); PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967); PRESIDENT'S
COMM. ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS
(1967); PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE
REPORT: THE POLICE (1967); Samuel Walker, Origins of the American Criminal Justice Paradigm:
The American Bar Foundation Survey, 1953-1969, 9 JUST. Q. 47 (1992).
84. See Coles, supra note 79, at 183-84.
85. See id. at 183-86.
86. Id. at 185.
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source constraints, the greater the number of case dispositions and severity
of the sentences received, the better the prosecutor has done her job.17 More-
over, prosecutors' expertise and public mandate to hold lawbreakers
accountable require a certain amount of prosecutorial authority and discre-
tion, which largely shields their decision-making processes from judicial or
legislative review or public examination." Reelection pressures are suffi-
cient to prevent prosecutorial overreaching. Otherwise, prosecutors should
operate largely free from citizen input or control." Nor should prosecutors,
given their unique role, be expected to work with other governmental enti-
ties.
Even accepting the wisdom of the case processing model, unmodified
Do-Justice Adversarialism simply cannot be squared with modem under-
standings of the criminal justice system. Everyone, including prosecutors, is
affected by subconscious forces.9' These forces include the ill effects of im-
plicit racial biases, cognitive overload, limited resources, and group
polarization on prosecutorial accuracy.9 Rephrased, blindness about such
forces can lead to wrongful convictions, unintentional rights violations,
grossly disproportionate punishments, and other forms of prosecutorial er-
ror.9 ' Surely even the most ardent defenders of the case processing model
could not justify it by accepting undeserved punishments. Ample research
suggests, however, that too often this is just what happens.94
Modified Do-Justice Adversarialism tinkers with the current dominant
model by taking these subconscious forces into account. The focus is still on
each individual case's disposition, but accuracy requires being aware of the
broader psychological and social forces that can lead to erroneous disposi-
tions. Moreover, some tracking of the patterns of case dispositions is
necessary, if only to ensure that like cases are treated alike. Modern com-
puter technology makes such tracking relatively easy.95 Prosecutors need not
be able to read minds, but they must be trained in the relevant psychological
literature, involved in decision-making processes that expose their precon-
ceptions to critique, and trained in systems that can highlight potential
87. Id. at 186.
88. Id.
89. See id.
90. See id.; John L. Worrall, Prosecution in America: A Historical and Comparative Ac-
count, in THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR, supra note 79, 3, 18-19.
91. See Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 18 (1998) (arguing that unconscious and systemic prosecutor racial bias
occurs at every stage of the criminal justice process).
92. See Taslitz, Prosecutorial Preconditions, supra note 51, at 21-23.
93. See generally DAVIS, supra note 72, 123-42 (analyzing consequences of prosecutorial
failures).
94. See Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Duty to Avoid Wrongful Convictions: A
Thought Experiment in the Regulation of Prosecutors, 89 B.U. L. REv. 1 (2009) (reviewing prosecu-
tor contributions to wrongful convictions and the ethical implications).
95. See Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IowA L. REv. 125, 129, 133-
66 (2008) (illustrating such a use of technology in New Orleans).
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sources of prosecutor bias.6 These approaches are not pie-in-the-sky. They
are already being tried in various offices-with prosecutors' voluntary co-
operation, and often on their own initiative. Detailed models are thus readily
available.
As applied to informants, Do-Justice Adversarialism would require
prosecutors to be trained in the social science literature concerning the risks
of informant lies, jurors' inability to detect them, and methods for minimiz-
ing these lies. This new model would also require prosecutors to develop
detailed best practices for dealing with informants and create internal me-
chanisms for implementing those practices and improving them over time.
Additionally, the new model would require prosecutors to be aware of the
literature governing their own subconscious biases and how to overcome
them. Prosecutors have the power and the obligation to act in individual cas-
es to do justice in an informed way, even if they are not compelled to do so
by courts or legislatures, and many prosecutors stand ready to do just that.
Perhaps the greater flaw in the traditional model, however, is its failure
to recognize that individual decisions, even when justifiable in isolation, do
not cumulatively maximize social welfare. Indeed, they may do more harm
than good. Prosecutors can often judge when this occurs and take steps to
correct it. Nothing in current ethical models-though much in modem pro-
secutorial practice-addresses the prosecutor's obligation to the broader
social good. A different metaphor-that of healer to patient-can fill this
role.
2. The Medical Model
The Medical Model views the "patient" as the "body of the people," an
embodied metaphor having its roots in the Framing Era." The healer (the
prosecutor) is to treat the patient holistically, recognizing that the health of
the mind (conscious or otherwise) and the body interact. Moreover, preven-
tion is better than treatment. Treatment, if necessary, should at least do no
harm. The Medical Model thus expressly mandates that the prosecutor con-
sider the impact of her work on the entire social body, making efforts not
96. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Eyewitness Identification, Democratic Deliberation, and the
Politics of Science, 4 CARDOZO Pus. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 271 (2006) (articulating and defending
the necessary processes of critique and training).
97. See Miller & Wright, supra note 95 (giving some examples). The American Bar Associa-
tion, for example, recently completed a training course for prosecutors and other criminal justice
system participants on how to be "culturally competent;" that is, to avoid biased or error-prone
decisions based on ignorance of the subconscious forces that can result in miscommunication or
misunderstanding of racial and other subcultural variations. See AM. BAR Ass'N, BUILDING COM-
MUNITY TRUST: IMPROVING CROSS-CULTURAL COMMUNICATION IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
7 (2010). The course includes studying psychological and implicit biases and community percep-
tions, as well as the sociology of micro-inequalities, unearned privilege, and cross-cultural
communication. Id. at 27-67. The course manual includes active learning techniques and a guide to
best practices. Id.
98. ANDREw E. TASLITZ, RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: A HISToRY OF
SEARCH AND SEIZURE, 1789-1868, at 70-71 (2006).
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only to minimize harm from her ministrations but to prevent other sorts of
harm within her purview from occurring in the first place.
The Medical Model has been evolving for some time. Some prosecutors
saw reflexive tough-on-crime strategies as doing too little to reduce crime,
especially violence.99 Others found that nontraditional tools, such as forfei-
ture and civil injunctions, were more effective than criminal prosecution
alone in addressing difficult problems like gang activity and organized
crime.'" Organized victims, in the form of the victim's rights movement,
perhaps surprisingly brought pressure on prosecutors not only to pay more
attention to victims' material and emotional needs but also to seek alterna-
tives to traditional punishments.' Local, loosely organized minority groups
likewise sought creative solutions to both the crime rampant in their neigh-
borhoods and the excessive, sometimes humiliating, law enforcement
response.'" These and other groups sought a greater voice in prosecutorial
decision making and more transparency and accountability for law enforce-
ment.1o3 Prosecutors, along with progressive police departments, have also
become more keenly aware of some key teachings of procedural justice re-
search: fair treatment by law enforcement increases citizen willingness both
to obey the law and to cooperate with the police; unfair treatment does the
opposite.' Additionally, many prosecutors have come to understand that the
fate of the individual and her community are strongly linked.'05
Meetings of the Executive Session for State and Local Prosecutors held
at Harvard University in the late 1980s helped to crystallize prosecutorial
thinking and practice.'06 Those meetings identified five types of prosecutors,
three of which fit the Medical Model. First, "problem-solvers" will use any
tool, not merely traditional prosecution, to attack crime-related problems,
even if it means mobilizing joint efforts with other government agencies and
99. See Coles, supra note 79, at 188-89.
100. Id.; see generally JAMEs B. JACOBS, GOTHAM UNBOUND: How NEW YORK CITY WAS
LIBERATED FROM THE GRiP OF ORGANIZED CRIME (1999) (analyzing New York prosecutors' use of
such innovative tactics to defeat the mob's dominance of certain industries).
101. See M. Elaine Nugent-Borakove, Performance Measures and Accountability, in THE
CHANGING ROLE OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR, supra note 79, 91, 101 (discussing the victims'
rights movement); Andrew E. Taslitz, Fourth Amendment Federalism and the Political Silencing of
The American Poor, 85 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 277, 293-98 (2010) (explaining why victims sometimes
seek less harsh and more creative punishments than do many legislators, judges, and prosecutors).
102. See Coles, supra note 79, at 189.
103. See id. at 196; Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Prcedure,
81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 911 (2006).
104. See Taslitz, Prosecutorial Preconditions, supra note 51, at 24-26.
105. See Catherine M. Coles & George L. Kelling, Prevention through Community Prosecu-
tion, 136 PUB. INT. 69, 72-74 (1999); Kay L. Levine, The New Prsecution, 40 WAKE FOREST L.
REv. 1125, 1128-29 (2005).
106. See Coles, supra note 79, at 190; ZACHARY TUMIN, SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS: FIND-
INGS AND DISCOVERIES OF THE HARVARD EXECUTIVE SESSION FOR STATE AND LOCAL PROSECUTORS
AT THE JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, 1986-1990 (1990) [hereinafter Kennedy
School Report].
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seeking funding for novel programs.'or Brooklyn District Attorney Charles
Hynes's creation of the Drug Treatment Alternative to Prison ("DTAP")
Program is perhaps the best-known example. The program extends thera-
peutic drug treatment even to high-risk, prison-bound drug sellers.'os
Hynes's team created the program, established an in-house research unit to
monitor and improve the program's performance, partnered with external
researchers, and obtained the funding to create and sustain it. "
Second, "institution builders" focus more directly on community institu-
tional vitality-building strong families, schools, and civic and religious
institutions. Institution builders might thus reach out to involve the com-
munity in crime-prevention efforts like community watches, in enhancing
school safety and student performance, and in improving the provision of
health and social services."' Third, "strategic investors" do not simply take
the resources available as a given, but creatively pursue ways to expand
those resources to achieve prosecutorial reform goals."' These three catego-
ries of prosecutor are, of course, ideal types, and they may occur in varying
combinations in any single prosecutors' office."'
One of the highest profile consequences of this new model is the rise of
community prosecutors, who see their mission as making communities safer
by any means necessary.'4 They seek to strengthen the bonds between law
enforcement and the local community, respond to discrete problems in par-
ticular locations, draw support directly from community leaders and
ordinary citizens, and give citizens a "direct line to the prosecutor's of-
fice.""5 Community members, not only the police, thus become an important
source of influence on the nature and degree of prosecutor services."'6 The
community prosecutor therefore embraces transparency of operations and
decision making and direct accountability for results."7
However, results are measured by reduced victimization, increased safe-
ty, improved overall communal health, and closer ties among citizens,
police, and prosecutors."' Prosecutors thus expand their tactics to include
107. Coles, supra note 79, at 190.
108. See Steven Belenko et al., Prosecutors and Treatment Diversion: The Brooklyn (NY)
Drug Treatment Alternative to Prison Prgram, in THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE AMERICAN PROSE-
CUTOR, supra note 79, 111.
109. Id. at 130.
110. Coles, supra note 79, at 190.
111. See id.
112. See KENNEDY SCHOOL REPORT, supra note 106, at 6-7.
113. Nugent-Borakove, supra note 101, at 94.
114. See Coles, supra note 79, at 191, 193.
115. Id. at 193.
116. See id. at 194.
117. See id. at 196; Worrall, supra note 90, at 18-20 (comparing the old "closed" prosecuto-
rial system with the new "open" one).
118. Coles, supra note 79, at 191-92; Nugent-Borakove, supra note 101.
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"targeted and expedited criminal prosecutions, civil remedies, nuisance ab-
atement, code enforcement, establishing new institutions (a day report
center, or problem-solving court), crafting legislation, developing working
protocols among agencies, and fund-raising for new activities.""9
Technological advancements have also made the data gathering neces-
sary for this broadened role feasible. Two efforts are particularly well-
known. The first is that undertaken by former New Orleans chief prosecutor
Harry Connick, Sr., who had his assistants keep detailed records for more
than a decade of their choices and the reasons for them.'20 He used this data-
base to craft office policy.121 Second, prosecutors in Milwaukee, Charlotte,
and San Diego have participated in a prosecutor-management project of the
Vera Institute focused on identifying and correcting for the subconscious
influence of racial bias.122 Both of these efforts are clearly relevant to Do-
Justice Adversarialism's focus on justice in the individual case. But they
also demonstrate how computer technology can enhance prosecutor infor-
mation bases in ways that can contribute to judging the broader social
impacts that are the Medical Model's focus.
Prosecutor-specific information on practices and the reasons behind
them must, of course, be combined with other databases on broader social
impacts. But this observation reflects the wisdom of prosecutors operating
under the Medical Model joining with social scientists, as Charles Hynes
did with his DTAP program in Brooklyn.123 One type of impact data con-
cerns community perceptions of law enforcement, partly because of their
procedural justice effects, and partly because they may identify problems
and solutions that had otherwise escaped law enforcement's attention.124
Cincinnati has pioneered such efforts, receiving frequent reports on commu-
nity perceptions of various policing activities and responding to them.125
A Medical-Model-infused ethic would require prosecutors to work with
the police more closely. Prosecutors can bring pressure for changes in police
practices, educate the police, join them in some investigations, and partner
119. Coles, supra note 79, at 196.
120. See Miller & Wright, supra note 95, at 129, 133-59.
121. See id. at 134-35.
122. See id. at 129-30, 162-66.
123. See Belenko et al., supra note 108, at 116-32.
124. See Taslitz, Prosecutorial Preconditions, supra note 51, at 24-26.
125. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Racial Auditors and the Fourth Amendment: Data with the Power
to Inspire Political Action, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 221, 244-48 (2003) (focusing on Cincin-
nati's early efforts at data gathering, transparency, and police accountability); see also Everyday
Democracy, Pmfiles of Successful Dialogue-to-Change Prgrams for Impmving Community-Police
Relations, Sept. 20, 2005, http://www.everyday-democracy.org/en/Article.308.aspx (summarizing
positive efforts of seeking community sentiments in crafting crime-fighting programs in Carbondale,
IL, Owensburg, KY, and Buffalo, NY). See generally GREG RIDGEWAY ET AL., RAND CORPORATION,
POLICE-COMMUNITY RELATIONS IN CINCINNATI (2009) (summarizing Cincinnati's partnering with
social scientists).
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with them in enhancing law enforcement's relationship with the commu-
nity.126
Illustrative Medical Model implications for addressing the broader ill
social impacts of our current snitch culture could include prosecutors setting
up internal tracking systems to gauge office practices and working with so-
cial scientists to monitor the real and perceived impacts of those practices.
Prosecutors could track variables such as disparate racial and class impact
across communities; the overall percentage of persons in each community
who snitch and the likely cumulative impact; and the degree to which in-
formant use is increasing or decreasing crime. Prosecutors could routinely
seek community input concerning police and prosecutor policies governing
informant use. Moreover, prosecutors could create internal and external re-
view committees to consider, for example, the availability of affordable,
effective alternatives to widespread informant use as a means of investigat-
ing crime; the expansion of community trust and involvement in crime
resolution and prosecution; the coordination of social services with other
government agencies to minimize ill effects on families and employment;
and the writing and frequent revision of prosecutorial office policies on in-
formant use.127 Prosecutors have boldly undertaken similar efforts in other
areasl28 and can succeed here too simply by recognizing their obligation to
try and removing the blinders imposed by too narrow a vision of their social
role.
CONCLUSION
Natapoff's book has rightly received the American Bar Association's
honorable mention for the Silver Gavel Award for best criminal justice book
of the year.'2 The book is a concise, powerful summary of the law and so-
cial science on informant use, highlighting with more clarity and force than
any other source the risk that informant abuses pose in individual cases.
Even more importantly, however, the book is the only one to make a con-
vincing case that the cumulation of even the best-intentioned judgments
about how to use informants in individual cases can, in the aggregate, do
serious social harm. Natapoff makes sound recommendations for law re-
forms. Here I expand on this last point by arguing that prosecutors have both
the obligation and the ability to step up to the plate and find creative solu-
126. Cf ABA STANDARDS ON PROSECUTORIAL INVESTIGATION No. 1.3 (2008), available at
http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/standards/pinvestigate.html#1.3 (last visited Sept. 24, 2010) (sum-
marizing special duties of prosecutors when partnering with police in investigating crime).
127. Cf Jailhouse Informants, LEGAL POLICIES MANUAL (Los Angeles County District Attor-
ney's Office), Apr. 2005, at 187-90 (creating an internal Jailhouse Informant Committee that must
approve using an informant as a witness and requiring first checking the Central Index of Jailhouse
Informants to monitor prior involvement of the witness with the justice system as an informant).
128. See supra text accompanying notes 114-125.
129. Posting of Alexandra Natapoff to Snitching Blog, www.snitching.org (May 1, 2010)
(noting that her book received a 2010 ABA Silver Gavel Award Honorable Mention for Books, the
awards being given to outstanding communications media that are "exemplary in helping to foster
the American public's understanding of the law and the legal system").
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tions by partnering with the community. Prosecutors who have not already
done so need to cast aside an ill-informed, unduly narrow and archaic vision
of their responsibilities. They have a special role to play in bringing sanity
to informant practices, and I have little doubt that many more of them will
come to embrace that role and view Natapoff's counsel as that of friend, not
foe.
